From today and two weeks ahead, SCCL welcomes visiting researcher Roni Laakso from University of Helsinki. His main field of interest is Banking Law. The topic of his dissertation is “Corporate Governance in Systemic Banks – Reducing Risk Appetite and Systemic Risk through the Regulation of Board Governance“.

The goal of the dissertation is to develop a theoretical model on how board governance in systemic banks could be structured and regulated in order to reduce risk appetite, and to lower the probability of systemic instability in the banking sector. The model utilizes the board as a mechanism to merge the interests of shareholders and creditors in terms of risk appetite. Creditors are used as a proxy for representing the interests of the wider set of risk-averse stakeholders. The dissertation will shed more light to a topic that has both practical and academic relevance, namely the implications of different regulatory regimes for the risk appetite of large systemic banks.